What the ASOS incident reveals about the reach of stolen credentials

On 6 October, some ASOS customers received a threatening notification through the retailer’s own app. The message claimed attackers had fully compromised its Snowflake instance and threatened to leak data.

That claim remains unverified, although ASOS has confirmed that an unauthorised party impersonated a trusted contact to obtain an employee’s login credentials, which were subsequently used to access information held on certain third-party platforms.

The incident highlights a wider challenge: the damage caused by stolen credentials depends on how far an account’s access extends. 

The reach of a single account

An employee’s login can function much like a set of keys. Through single sign-on, one account may provide access to internal systems alongside external marketing, sales and customer management platforms. This simplifies everyday tasks but also makes it essential for security teams to know which applications are connected and what each account can do.

For attackers, obtaining valid credentials can provide access to these connected services, depending on the permissions and security measures in place. The potential consequences extend beyond the organisation’s internal network, particularly where third-party applications hold customer records or allow employees to communicate directly with users.

Customer messaging platforms deserve particular attention. Someone with permission to distribute app notifications may be able to contact thousands of customers at once. If an attacker gains that level of access, a trusted communication channel can quickly be used to send threatening messages under the organisation’s name. The ASOS incident illustrates how these platforms can be misused, even while questions remain about the wider extent of the intrusion.

When permissions accumulate

A common weakness in identity security is privilege creep, where employees gradually accumulate access rights that are no longer necessary for their roles. Over time, these permissions can be forgotten about, leaving employees unaware of just how much access they hold and the potential security risk their account presents.

Consider an IT administrator who adds permissions to their account to resolve a technical issue. Those permissions remain active once the work is complete. Several months later, another problem requires further access, and the process repeats. Over time, the account may acquire considerably more authority than originally intended, increasing the potential damage should an attacker successfully steals their credentials.

Similar problems can develop through third-party applications. Businesses regularly introduce new software to support activities such as lead management or customer communications. These services may contain significant amounts of personal information, while employees at third-party providers may also have access to data and connected systems belonging to multiple organisations. This means a compromised account could potentially expose more than one business to risk. Yet these access rights are not always reviewed or monitored consistently.

Regular access reviews can help organisations identify permissions that have outlived their purpose. Security teams should maintain an accurate record of connected applications, assess which accounts have access to them and remove unnecessary privileges. 

Higher-risk activities, such as sending notifications to an entire customer base, should also have additional safeguards. Requiring approval from a second authorised person, for example, can reduce the risk of a single compromised account being used to carry out such an action unchecked.

Strengthening protection and detection

Phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication should be a priority for organisations looking to prevent attackers from using stolen credentials to gain access. Passkeys and FIDO2 hardware security keys offer stronger protection against phishing than authentication methods that rely on users entering codes received by text message. These measures are particularly valuable for accounts with elevated privileges or access to customer data.

Businesses should also review how they verify identity during password resets and other account recovery requests. When a service desk receives an unexpected request, staff should call the employee back on a trusted number already held on record, rather than relying on contact details supplied by the caller. This helps reduce the risk of attackers impersonating employees and persuading support teams to grant access.

Alongside preventative measures, organisations need visibility into how accounts are being used. Monitoring unusual logins, unexpected downloads and changes to authentication methods can help security teams identify suspicious activity. Where possible, logs from third-party platforms should also feed into the organisation’s security monitoring, allowing analysts to investigate activity across connected systems.

When an account compromise is identified, containment should begin immediately. Disabling the affected account, resetting its password, revoking active sessions and any compromised keys or tokens, and removing unauthorised authentication methods can help prevent further misuse. Investigators then need to establish which systems were accessed, whether information was taken and what reporting or customer communications may be required.

In the ASOS incident, the unauthorised notification made the intrusion visible to customers. An attacker attempting to remain undetected might not have provided such an obvious warning.

Businesses therefore need a clear understanding of the access associated with every identity, supported by regular permission reviews and monitoring that extends across third-party services. The earlier security teams can recognise unusual account activity, the greater their opportunity to contain an intrusion before further damage occurs.

 

 

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